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This paper proposes that idiosyncratic firm-level fluctuations can explain an important part of aggregate
shocks, and provide a microfoundation for aggregate productivity shocks. Existing research has focused
on using aggregate shocks to explain business cycles, arguing that individual firm shocks average
out in aggregate. I show that this argument breaks down if the distribution of firm sizes is fat-tailed,
as documented empirically. The idiosyncratic movements of the largest 100 firms in the US appear
to explain about one third of variations in output and the Solow residual. This "granular" hypothesis
suggests new directions for macroeconomic research, in particular that macroeconomic questions can
be clarified by looking at the behavior of large firms. This paper's ideas and analytical results may
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This paper proposes a simple origin of aggregate shocks. It develops the view that a large part
of aggregate ﬂuctuations arises from idiosyncratic shocks to individual ﬁrms. This approach
sheds light on a number of issues that are diﬃcult to address in models that postulate aggregate
shocks. Although economy-wide shocks (inﬂation, wars, policy shocks) are no doubt important,
they have diﬃculty in explaining most ﬂuctuations (Cochrane 1994, Summers 1986). Often, the
explanation for year-to-year jumps of aggregate quantities is elusive. On the other hand, there is
a large amount of anecdotal evidence for the importance of idiosyncratic shocks. For instance, in
December 2004, the $24 billion one-time Microsoft dividend boosted growth in personal income
from 0.6% to 3.7%.1 A macroeconomist would have diﬃc u l t yi ne x p l a i n i n gt h i sj u m pi np e r s o n a l
income without examining individual ﬁrm behavior. The OECD (2004) analyzes that in 2000,
Nokia contributed 1.6 percentage points of Findland’s GDP growth. Likewise, shocks to GDP
may stem from a variety of events, such as successful innovations by Wal-Mart, the diﬃculties
of a Japanese bank, new exports by Boeing, a strike at General Motors.2
Since modern economies are dominated by large ﬁrms, idiosyncratic shocks to these ﬁrms
can lead to non-trivial aggregate shocks. For instance, in Korea, the top two ﬁrms (Samsung
and Hundyai) together account for 35% of exports, and the sales of those two ﬁrms account for
22% of Korean GDP (di Giovanni and Levchenko 2009). In Japan, the top 10 ﬁrms account for
35% of the exports (Canals et al. 2007). For the U.S., Figure 1 reports the total sales of the top
50 and 100 ﬁrms as a fraction of GDP. On average, the sales of the top 50 ﬁrms are 24% of GDP,
while the sales of the top 100 ﬁrms are 29% of GDP. The top 100 ﬁrms hence represent a large
part of the macroeconomic activity, and so understanding their actions gives a good insight into
aggregate economy.
In this view, many economic ﬂuctuations are not due, primitively, to small diﬀuse shocks
that directly aﬀect every ﬁrm. Instead, many economic ﬂuctuations are attributable to the
incompressible “grains” of economic activity, the large ﬁrms. I call this view the “granular”
hypothesis. In the granular view, idiosyncratic shocks to large ﬁrms have the potential to
generate small aggregate shocks that aﬀect GDP, and via general equilibrium, all ﬁrms.
The granular hypothesis oﬀers a microfoundation for the aggregate shocks of real business
cycle models (Kydland and Prescott 1982). Hence, real business cycle shocks are not, at heart,
mysterious “aggregate productivity shocks” or “a measure of our ignorance” (Abramovitz 1956).
Instead, they are well-deﬁned shocks to individual ﬁrms. The granular hypothesis sheds light
1Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, January 31, 2005.
2The example of Nokia is extreme but may be useful. In 2003, worldwide sales of Nokia were $37 billion,
representing 26% of Finland’s GDP of $142 billion. This is not suﬃcient for a proper assessment of Nokia’s
importance, but gives some order of magnitude, as the Finnish base of Nokia is an important residual claimant
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Figure 1: Sum of the sales of the top 50 and 100 non-oil ﬁrms in Compustat, as a fraction of
GDP. Hulten’s theorem (Appendix B) motivates the use of sales rather than value added.
on a number of other issues, such as the dependence of the amplitude of GDP ﬂuctuations
on GDP level, the microeconomic composition of GDP, the distribution of GDP and ﬁrm-level
ﬂuctuations.
In most of this paper, the standard deviation of the percentage growth rate of a ﬁrm is
assumed to be independent of its size.3 This explains why individual ﬁrms can matter in the
aggregate. If Wal-Mart doubles its number of supermarkets and thus its size, its variance is not
divided by two – as would be the case if Wal-Mart was the amalgamation of many independent
supermarkets. Instead, the newly acquired supermarkets inherit the “Wal-Mart” shocks, and
the total percentage variance of Wal-Mart does not change. This paper conceptualizes these
shocks as productivity growth, but the analysis holds for other shocks.4
The main argument is summarized as follows. First, it is critical to show that 1/
√
N di-
versiﬁcation does not occur in an economy with a fat-tailed distribution of ﬁrms. A simple
diversiﬁcation argument shows that, in an economy with N ﬁrms with independent shocks, ag-
gregate ﬂuctuations should have a size proportional to 1/
√
N. Given that modern economies
3T h eb e n c h m a r kt h a tt h ev a r i a n c eo ft h ep e r c e n t a g eg r o w t hrate is approximately independent of size (“Gibrat’s
law” for variances) appears to hold to a good ﬁrst degree, see section 2.5.
4The productivity shocks can come from a decision of the ﬁrm’s research department, of the ﬁrm’s chief
executive oﬃcer, of how to process shipments, inventories, or which new line of products to try. They can also
stem from changes in capacity utilization, and particularly strikes. Suppose a ﬁrm, which uses only capital and
labor, is on strike for half the year. For many purposes, its eﬀective productivity that year is halved. This paper
does not require the productivity shocks to arise from any particular source.
3can have millions of ﬁrms, this suggests that idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations will have a negligible
aggregate eﬀect. This paper points out that, when ﬁrm size is power-law distributed, the con-
ditions under which one derives the central limit theorem break down, and other mathematics
apply (see Appendix A). In the central case of Zipf’s law, aggregate volatility decays according
to 1/lnN, rather than 1/
√
N. The strong 1/
√
N diversiﬁcation is replaced by a much milder
o n et h a td e c a y sa c c o r d i n gt o1/lnN. In an economy with a fat-tailed distribution of ﬁrms,
diversiﬁcation eﬀects due to country size are quite small.
Section 4 then investigates accordingly the proportion of aggregate shocks that can be ac-
counted for by idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations. I construct the “granular residual” Γt,w h i c hi sa
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where git−gt is a simple measure of the idiosyncratic shock to ﬁrm i. Regressing the growth rate
of GDP on the granular residual yields an R2 of roughly one third. Prima facie, this means that
idiosyncratic shocks to the top 100 ﬁrms in the U.S. can explain one third of the ﬂuctuations of
GDP and the Solow residual.
Having established that idiosyncratic shocks do not die out in the aggregate, I show in
section 5 that they are of the correct order of magnitude to explain business cycles. A result
based on Hulten (1978) shows that, if ﬁrm i has a productivity shock dπi, these shocks are
i.i.d., and there is no ampliﬁcation mechanism, then the standard deviation of TFP growth
is σTFP = σπhS,w h e r eσπ is the standard deviation of the i.i.d. productivity shocks, and
hS is the sales Herﬁndahl of the economy. Using the estimate of volatility of productivity of
σπ = 12%/year, the sales Herﬁndahl of hS =6 .1% for the US in 2002, one predicts a TFP
volatility equal to σTFP = 12%·6.1% = 0.9%. Standard ampliﬁcation mechanisms generate the
order of magnitude of business cycle ﬂuctuations, σGDP =1 .4%. Non-US data leads to even
larger business cycle ﬂuctuations. I conclude that idiosyncratic volatility seems quantitatively
large enough to matter at the macroeconomic level.
Previous economists have proposed mechanisms that generate macroeconomic shocks from
purely microeconomic causes. A pioneering paper is Jovanovic (1987), whose models generate
non-vanishing aggregate ﬂuctuations owing to a multiplier proportional to
√
N, the square root of
the number of ﬁrms. However, Jovanovic’s theoretical multiplier of
√
N ' 1000 is much larger
than is empirically plausible.5 Nonetheless, Jovanovic’s model spawned a lively intellectual
quest. Durlauf (1993) generates macroeconomic uncertainty with idiosyncratic shocks and local
5If the actual multiplier was so large, the impact of trade shocks, for instance, would be much higher than we
observe.
4interactions between ﬁrms. The drivers of his results are the non-linear interactions between
ﬁrms, while in this paper it is the skewed distribution of ﬁrms. Bak, Chen, Scheinkman, and
Woodford (1993) apply the physical theory of self-organizing criticality. While there is much to
learn from their approach, it generates ﬂuctuations more fat-tailed than in reality, with inﬁnite
means. Nirei (2006) proposes a model where aggregate ﬂuctuations arise from (s,S) rules at the
ﬁrm level, in the spirit of Bak et al. (1993). These models are conceptually innovative, but
they they are hard to work with theoretically ande m p i r i c a l l y .T h em e c h a n i s mp r o p o s e di nt h i s
paper is tractable, and relies on readily observable quantities.
Long and Plosser (1983) suggest that sectorial (rather than ﬁrm) shocks might account for
GDP ﬂuctuations. As their model has a small number of sectors, those shocks can be viewed as
mini-aggregate shocks. Horvath (1998, 2000) and Conley and Dupor (2003) explore this hypoth-
esis further. They ﬁnd that sector-speciﬁc shocks are an important source of aggregate volatility.
Finally, Horvath (1998) and Dupor (1999) debate whether N sectors can have a volatility that
does not decay according to 1/
√
N.I ﬁnd an alternative solution to their debate, which is,
formalized in Proposition 2. My approach relies on those earlier contributions, and clariﬁes that
the fat-tailed nature of the sectoral shocks is important theoretically, as it determines whether
the central limit theorem applies.
Studies disagree somewhat on the relative importance of sector speciﬁc shocks, aggregate
shocks, and complementarities. Shea (2002) quantiﬁes that complementarities play a major role
in aggregate business cycle ﬂuctuations. Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997) ﬁnd that
aggregate shocks are important, while Horvath (1998) concludes that sector-speciﬁcs h o c k sg oa
long way toward explaining aggregate disturbances. Many of these eﬀects in this paper could be
expressed in terms of sectors. Carvahlo (2009) studies granular eﬀects in the economy viewed
as a network, by looking at the size of sectors and their interconnectedness.
Pareto (1896) was the ﬁrst to discover that the income distribution follows a power law. A
growing number of other economic variables appear to follow power laws: in particular Zipf’s
law, which is a power law with an exponent close to 1. This includes the size of cities (Zipf
1949, Gabaix 2009), ﬁrms (Axtell 2001, Fujiwara et al. 2004, Okuyama et al. 1999), mutual
funds (Gabaix et al. 2006), Internet sites (Barabasi and Albert 1999). The origin of this Zipf
distribution is becoming better understood (Simon 1955, Gabaix 1999, 2009, Luttmer 2007,
Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2007).
Granular eﬀects are likely to be even stronger outside the U.S, as the U.S. is more diversiﬁed
than most other countries. One number reported in the literature is the value of the assets
controlled by the richest 10 families, divided by GDP. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) ﬁnd
a number equal to 38% in Asia, including 84% of GDP in Hong Kong, 76% in Malaysia, 39% in
Thailand. Faccio and Lang (2002) also ﬁnd that the top 10 families control 21% of listed assets
in their sample of European ﬁrms. It would be interesting to transpose the present analysis to
5those countries, and to other entities than ﬁrms — for instance, business groups, or sectors.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model. Section 3 provides
a richer model that gives a foundation for the measurement of idiosyncratic shocks, and spells
out how production linkages can make all microeconomic and macroeconomic variables comove.
Section 4 shows directly that the idiosyncratic movements of ﬁrms appear to explain, year by
year, about one third of actual ﬂuctuations in GDP and the Solow residual. Section 5 provides
a calibration that indicates that the eﬀects are of the right order of magnitude to account for
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Core Idea
2.1. A Simple “Islands” Economy
This section uses a concise model to illustrate the idea. In this economy there are only idiosyn-








where σi is ﬁrm i’s volatility and εi,t+1 are uncorrelated random variables with mean 0 and






































Hence the variance of GDP, σ2
GDP, is the weighted sum of the variance σ2
i of idiosyncratic shocks





, the squared share of output for which that ﬁrm i accounts. If the
ﬁrms all have the same volatility σi = σ, we obtain:
σGDP = σh (4)










For simplicity, h will be referred to as the “Herﬁndahl” of the economy.
This paper works ﬁrst with the basic model (1)-(2), which can be viewed as the linearization of




N Argument for the Irrelevance of Idiosyncratic Shocks
Macroeconomists often appeal to aggregate (or at least sector-wide) shocks, since idiosyncratic
ﬂuctuations disappear in the aggregate if there is a large number of ﬁrms N.C o n s i d e r ﬁrms







To estimate the order of magnitude of the cumulative eﬀect of idiosyncratic shocks, take an
estimate of ﬁrm volatility σ = 12% from Section (5), and consider an economy with N =1 0 6







103 =0 .012% per year.
Such a GDP volatility of 0.012% is much too small to account for the empirically-measured
size of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations of around 1%. This is why economists typically appeal to
aggregate shocks. More general modeling assumptions predict a 1/
√
N scaling, as shown by the
next Proposition, whose proof is in Appendix B.
Proposition 1 Consider an islands economy with N ﬁrms whose sizes are drawn from a distri-











Proposition 1 will be contrasted with Proposition 2 below, which shows that diﬀerent models
o ft h es i z ed i s t r i b u t i o no fﬁrms lead to dramatically diﬀerent results.
6Axtell (2001) reports that in 1997 there were 5.5 million ﬁrms in the United States.
7Figure 2: Log frequency lnf (S) vs log size lnS of U.S. ﬁrm sizes (by number of employees) for
1997. OLS ﬁt gives a slope of 2.059 (s.e.= 0.054; R2 =0.992). This corresponds to a frequency
f (S) ∼ S−2.059, i.e. a power law distribution with exponent ζ =1 .059. T h i si sv e r yc l o s et o
Zipf’s law, which says that ζ =1 . Source: Axtell (2001).
2.3. Empirical Evidence that for the Fat-Tailed Distribution of Firms
Empirical evidence suggests that a good parameterization for the ﬁrm size distribution is a
power law distribution:
P (S>x )=ax−ζ. (7)
for x>a 1/ζ. To estimate (7), it is useful to take the density f (x)=ζa/xζ+1, and its logarithm
lnf (x)=−(ζ +1 )l nx + C (8)
where C is a constant. An extensive literature has estimated the size distribution of ﬁrms, but
typically the sample includes only ﬁrms listed in the stock market. Axtell (2001) extends the
literature by using the Census, which lists all the U.S. ﬁrms.
I reproduce his plot of (8) in Figure 2. The horizontal axis shows lnx,w h e r ex is the size of
a ﬁrm in number of employees. The vertical axis shows the log of the fraction of ﬁrms with size
x, lnf (x). We expect to see a straight line in the region where (8) holds, and indeed the Figure
shows a very clear ﬁt.7 An OLS ﬁt of (8) yields an estimate of R2 =0 .992,a n dζ =1 .059±0.054.
7Power law ﬁts are typically less good at the two extremes of the distribution. In Axtell’s data, which are
binned in powers of 3, the ﬁti sl e s sg o o df o rﬁr m sb e t w e e n1a n d3e m p l o y e e s .T h i sd o e sn o ta ﬀect our analysis,
which deals with large ﬁrms. The ﬁt may also be less good in the last bin, for the ﬁrms between 3
11 =309,000 and
8The size distribution of U.S. ﬁrms is well approximated by the power law with exponent ζ =1 .8
The rest of the paper will pay special attention to the case ζ =1 , the “Zipf” value. This
value (ζ ' 1) is often found in the social sciences, for instance in the size of cities (Zipf 1949),
and in the amount of assets under management of mutual funds (Gabaix et al. 2003) and banks
(Pushkin and Hassan 2004).9 The origins of this distribution are becoming better understood10.
The power law distribution (7) has fat tails, and thus produces some very large ﬁrms. The
next section studies its implications for GDP ﬂuctuations.
2.4. The Failure of the 1/
√
N Argument when the Firm Size Distribution is
Power Law
The next Proposition examines behavior under a “fat-tailed” distribution of ﬁrms. The proof is
in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 Consider an islands economy with a large number N of ﬁrms with volatility of
growth rate σ, and whose size distribution is a power law distribution P (S>x )=ax−ζ with




σ for ζ =1 (9)
σGDP ∼
vζ
N1−1/ζσ for 1 <ζ<2 (10)
σGDP ∼
vζ
N1/2σ for ζ ≥ 2 (11)
where vζ is a random variable that is independent of N and σ.
The ﬁrm size distribution has thin tails, i.e. ﬁnite variance, if and only if ζ>2.P r o p o s i t i o n
1 states that if the ﬁrm size distribution has thin tails, then σGDP d e c a y sa c c o r d i n gt oa s1/
√
N.
In contrast, Proposition 2 states that if the ﬁrm size distribution has fat tails (ζ<2), σGDP
decays much more slowly than 1/
√
N.
In the limit case of Zipf’s law (ζ =1 ), larger countries are barely more diversiﬁed than small
countries.11 The reason is that, if Zipf’s law holds, the top K ﬁrms of a country account for
3
12 =920,000 employees. But there are so few such ﬁrms, that it is unclear whether the deviation is statistically
signiﬁcant.
8Okuyama et al. (1999) and Fujiwara et al. (2004) also ﬁnd that ζ ' 1 for Japanese and European ﬁrms
respectively.
9Axtell (2001) shows also ζ ' 1 for sales.
10See Simon (1955), Gabaix (1999), Gabaix (2009) for a survey of various candidate explanations, and Luttmer
(2007) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) for recent developments.
11If there are N identical ﬁrms, 1/h
2
N = N.S o1/h
2
N reveals the “eﬀective” number of ﬁrms in the economy, for
diversiﬁcation purposes. So, in a Zipﬁan world (where ζ =1 ), the eﬀective number of ﬁr m si sn o tN but (lnN)
2.
For 1 <ζ<2,t h ee ﬀective number of ﬁrms scales as N
2−2/ζ. This notion of the “eﬀective” number of ﬁrms
is important as long as diversiﬁcation plays a role, as is the case in Caballero and Engel (2004) and the present
paper.
9a ﬁnite, as opposed to inﬁnitesimal, fraction of the total output.12 To see the result, take two
countries, 1 and 2, and suppose that country 2 is twice as large as country 1, in the sense that
it has twice as many ﬁrms as country 1. Firms in both countries are drawn from the same
distribution. If Zipf’s law holds, then the largest ﬁrm of country 2 will be, on average, twice as
large as the largest ﬁrm in country 1. Indeed, the largest K ﬁrms will be, on average, twice as
large in country 2 than in country 1. Hence, the relative share of the top K ﬁrms will be the
same in country 2 and country 1. The Herﬁndahls are the same, and, as GDP volatility comes
only from ﬁrm-level volatility in the scenario considered in Proposition 2, GDP volatilities are
the same. If the distribution is a power law with exponent ζ between 1 and 2, the same reasoning
holds, except that the largest ﬁrms in country 2 are 21/ζ larger than in country 1, so their share
of GDP is 21/ζ−1 < 1 that of country 1. Thus the volatility of country 2 is that of country 1,
times 21/ζ−1, as given by equation 10.
Proposition 2 oﬀers a resolution to the debate between Horvath (1998, 2000) and Dupor
(1999). Horvath submits evidence that sectorial shocks may be enough to generate aggregate
ﬂuctuations. Dupor (1999) debates this on theoretical grounds, and claims that Horvath is able
to generate large aggregate ﬂuctuations only because he uses a moderate number of sectors
(N =3 6 ). If he had much more disaggregated sectors (e.g. 100 times as many), then aggregate
volatility would decrease in 1/
√
N (e.g. 10 times smaller). Proposition 2 illustrates that both
viewpoints are correct, but apply in diﬀerent settings. Dupor’s reasoning holds only in a world
of small ﬁrms, when the central limit theorem can apply. Horvath’s empirical world is one where
the ﬁrm size distribution of ﬁr m si ss u ﬃciently leptokurtic that the central limit theorem does
not apply. Instead, Proposition 2 applies, and GDP volatility remains substantial even if the
number N of subunits is large.
Though the benchmark case of Zipf’s law is empirically relevant, and theoretically clean and
appealing, most of the arguments in this paper do not depend on it. The results only require
that the Herﬁndahl of actual economies is suﬃciently large. For instance, if the distribution of
ﬁrm sizes was lognormal with a suﬃciently high variance, then quantitatively very little would
change.
2.5. GDP Volatility When the Volatility of a Firm Depends on its Size
In o ws t u d yt h ec a s ew h e r et h ev o l a t i l i t yo faﬁrm’s percentage growth rate decreases with ﬁrm
size. I examine the functional form σFirm (S)=kS−α, from equation 12. If α>0, then large
ﬁrms have a smaller standard deviation that small ﬁrms. This was Hymer and Pashigan (1962)’s
original ﬁnding. A series of papers (Stanley et al. 1996, Amaral et al. 1997, Canning et al.
1998) quantify the relation more precisely, and showed that (12) holds for ﬁrms in Compustat,
12This is true up to a slowly varying factor, 1/lnN.
10with α ' 1/6.
It is unclear whether the conclusions from Compustat can generalize to the whole economy.
Compustat only comprises ﬁrms traded on the stock market and these are likely to be more
volatile than non-traded ﬁrms, as small volatile ﬁrms are more likely to seek outside equity
ﬁnancing, while large ﬁrms are in any case very likely to be listed in the stock market. This
selection bias implies that the value of α measured from Compustat ﬁrms alone is likely to be
larger than in a sample composed of all ﬁrms. It is indeed possible α may be 0 when estimated
on a sample that includes all ﬁrms, as random growth models have long postulated. Axtell
and Teitelbaum (2005), using on two years of data from the U.S. census, conclude that α ' 0.
Further research is needed to verify this on a comprehensive set of large ﬁrms over a long time
period.
In any case, any deviations from Gibrat’s law for variances are likely to be small, i.e. 0 ≤
α ≤ 1/6. If there is no diversiﬁcation as size increases, then α =0 . If there is full diversiﬁcation,
and a ﬁrm of size S is composed of S units, then α =1 /2. Empirically, ﬁrms are much closer to
the “Gibrat” benchmark of no diversiﬁcation, α =0 .
The next Proposition extends Propositions 1 and 2 to the case where ﬁrm volatility decreases
with ﬁrm size.
Proposition 3 Consider an islands economy, with N ﬁrms that have power law distribution
P (S>x )=x−ζ for ζ ∈ [1,∞). Assume that the volatility of a ﬁrm of size S is
σFirm (S)=kS−α (12)
for some α>0.D e ﬁne



















gt if ζ =1 (15)
such that when N →∞ , gt converges to a non-degenerate distribution. When ζ>1, gt converges
to a Lévy stable distribution with exponent min{ζ/(1 − α),2}.
In particular, the volatility σ (S) of GDP growth decreases as a power law function of GDP
11S:13
σGDP (S) ∼ S−α0
. (16)
To see the intuition for Proposition 3, we apply the case of Zipf’s law (ζ =1 )t ot h et w o -
country example of Proposition 2.14 Country 2 has twice as many ﬁr m sa sc o u n t r y1 .I t sl a r g e s t
K ﬁrms are twice as large as the largest ﬁrms of country 1. However, scaling according to (12)
implies that their volatility is 2−α times the volatility of ﬁrms in country 1. Hence, the volatility
of country 2’s GDP is 2−α times the volatility of country 1’s GDP, i.e. (16). Putting this another
way, under the case presented by Proposition 3, and ζ =1 , large ﬁrms are less volatile than
small ﬁrms (equation 12). The top ﬁrms in big countries are larger (in an absolute sense) than
top ﬁrms in small countries. As the top ﬁrms determine a country’s volatility, big countries have
less volatile GDP than small countries (equation 16).
Also, one can reinterpret Proposition 3 by interpreting a large “ﬁrm” as a “country” made up
of smaller entities. If these entities follow a power-law distribution, then Proposition 3 applies
and predicts that the ﬂuctuations of the growth rate ∆lnSit,o n c er e - s c a l e db yS−α
it ,f o l l o wa
Lévy distribution with exponent min{ζ/(1 − α),2}.A m a r a let al. (1997) and Canning et al.
(1998) plot this empirical distribution, which looks roughly like a Lévy stable distribution. It
could be that the fat tails distribution of ﬁrm growth come from the fat tail distribution of the
subcomponents of a ﬁrm.15
A corollary of Proposition 3 may be worth highlighting.
Corollary 1 (Similar scaling of ﬁrms and countries.) When Zipf’s law holds (ζ =1 )a n d
α ≤ 1/2, we have α0 = α, i.e. ﬁrms and countries should see their volatility scale with a similar
exponent:
σFirms (S) ∼ σGDP (S) ∼ S−α. (17)
Interestingly, Canning et al. (1998) and Lee et al. (1998) present evidence that supports
( 1 7 ) ,w i t ha ns m a l le x p o n e n tα ' α0 ' 1/6 (see also Koren and Tenreyro 2007). A more
systematic investigation of this issue would be interesting.
3. A Model with Comovement
The previous section has shown that how idiosyncratic ﬁrm shocks might explain a signiﬁcant
portion of aggregate ﬂuctuations. This section considers whether they can also create plausibly
13In this paper, f (S) ∼ g (S) for some functions f,g,m e a n st h a tt h er a t i of (S)/g (S) tends, for large S,t ob e
a positive real number. So f and g have the same scaling “up to a constant real factor”.
14When ζ =1 , the limiting distribution of g is a more complicated distribution, a ratio of two non-independent
Lévy distributions. Logan et al. (1973) provide an analysis of some such ratios.
15See Sutton (2002) for a related model; and Wyart and Bouchaud (2003) for a related analysis, which acknowl-
edges the contribution of the present article (which was ﬁrst circulated in the Fall 2001).
12the strong comovements between the various ﬁrms or sectors of the economy, as observed, for
instance, by Long and Plosser (1983), Shea (2002), Franco and Philippon (2008) and Foerster,
Sarte and Watson (2008). Horvath (1998), Long and Plosser (1983) and Shea (2002) present
models that generate comovement.16 Horvath (2000) calibrates a dynamic general equilibrium
model with many sectors. I present a simpliﬁed version of those models. Its main virtue is that
it is solvable in closed form, so that the mechanisms are fairly transparent.
After a shock to ﬁrm i, all the other ﬁrms adjust instantaneously, rather than over time
through the input-output matrix. There is an aggregate good. Each intermediate good ﬁrm i










bb (1 − b)
1−b (18)













with ψ>1. b is the share of intermediate inputs, and will also be the ratio of value added to
sales, both at the level of the ﬁrm, and of the economy.
The representative agent’s utility function is U = C− L1/ξ.17 There is no investment, so






To abstract from a potential ineﬃciency arising from positive markups, I assume that the
prices equal marginal cost. Several devices can generate this assumption. Firms could be com-
petitive because there is free entry — markets are contestable in the sense of Baumol (1982).
Another interpretation is that the “ﬁrms” are sectors made of competitive ﬁrms. A last pos-
sibility is that the government may have set an input subsidy equal to ψ for the intermediary
ﬁrms. In any case, even if there was a strictly positive, constant markup, the formulas for the
main results of this section (Proposition 4) would be unaﬀected.
16Long and Plosser (1983) impose a Cobb-Douglas structure, which imposes zero idiosyncratic movement in
the sales per employee and dollar sales.
17Here the utility function C− L
1/ξ simply captures the ﬂexibility of labor supply along the business cycle, as
formalized in equations (26)-(27). The linearity in C is for convenience only, as the model abstracts from interest
rate movements and capital accumulation.
13The model gives:
GDP : Y = ΛLαK1−α (20)









Sum of sales : H =
X












The result is standard, except for the b term in Eq. (21), which indicates that 1/b is a
“productivity multiplier”. If all ﬁrms increase their productivity Ai by 1%, TFP increases by
1/b %. This eﬀect comes from the fact that a Hicks-neutral productivity shock increases gross
output (sales), not just value added, and has been analyzed by Domar (1961), Hulten (1978)
and Jones (2009).18
I use the “hat” notation to indicate a proportional change: b Z = dZ/Z.19 I assume that
we start from a steady state equilibrium, and that, in the short run, labor but not capital is
reallocated across ﬁrms.20
Models such as (18) always deliver a Sales / Employees ratio that is independent of the
ﬁrm’s productivity.21 The reason for this almost surely counterfactual prediction, is that labor
is assumed to be costlessly adjustable. To capture the realistic case of labor adjustment costs, I
assume that a fraction 1−λ of labor is a quasi-ﬁxed factor, in the sense of Oi (1962). Technically,
Ir e p r e s e n t :Li = Lλ
V,iL1−λ
F,i ,w h e r eLV,i and LF,i are respectively the variable part labor and the
quasi-ﬁxed part of labor. After a small shock, only LV,i adjusts. The disutility of labor remains
L1/ξ,w h e r eL = Lλ
V L1−λ
F is aggregate labor.22 Likewise, I assume that capital is quasi-ﬁxed in
the short run.23
One can now study the eﬀect of a productivity shock b Ai to each ﬁrm i.Ic a l lSi = piQi the
18To see this eﬀect most clearly, consider an economy with a production function which, at the level
of the representative ﬁrm, is Q = A(L/b)
b (X/(1 − b))
1−b,w h e r eX is the intermediary inputs. GDP is
Y =m a x X A(L/b)
b (X/(1 − b))
1−b − X.S o l v i n g f o r X yields Y = A
1/bL. Though TFP is A at the ﬁrm
level, it is A
1/b at the aggregate level.
19The rules are well-known, and come from taking the logarithm and diﬀerentiating. For instance, \ XαY βZγ =
α e X + βe Y + γ e Z.
20This formulation allows for other variants. For instance, if both capital and labor can be reallocated, then
one replaces α, the current share of labor, by 1.
21If the sales are Si = f (Ai)L
θ
i, the frictionless optimum labor supply maximizes f (Ai)L
θ
i − wLi,a n ds oa t
the optimum, the ratio of sales per employee, Si/Li = w/θ, is independent of the productivity Ai.








23Proposition 4 describes the short term behavior. In a next iteration of this paper, the long term analysis
should be provided, including with the adjustment of quasi-ﬁxed labor, and capital. One can anticipate that these
extensions will not change materially the calibration for the short run.
14dollar sales of ﬁrm i.
Proposition 4 Suppose that each ﬁrm i receives a productivity shock b Ai. Macroeconomic vari-
ables change according to:











Employment : b L = ξb Y (26)
Wage : b w =( 1− ξ) b Y (27)
and ﬁrm-level variables change according to:
Dollar sales : b Si = b Xi = β b Ai +( 1− βb(1 − αξ)) b Y (28)
Production : b Qi = ψβ b Ai +( 1− ψβb(1 − αξ)) b Y (29)
Price : b pi = −(ψ − 1)β b Ai +( ψ − 1)βb(1 − αξ) b Y (30)
Employment : b Li = λβ b Ai + λ(ξ − βb(1 − αξ)) b Y (31)
Dollar sales per Employee : \ Si/Li =( 1− λ)β b Ai +( 1− λξ − (1 − λ)βb(1 − αξ)) b Y (32)
where
β =1 /(ψ − bαλ − 1+b) (33)
Equation (24) is Hulten’s (1978) equation. TFP is entirely the sum of idiosyncratic ﬁrm-level
shocks. Otherwise equations (25)-(27) are standard. GDP growth is TFP growth, multiplied by
an ampliﬁcation mechanism, labor supply.
The new results are the ﬁrm-level changes, in equations (28)-(32). The economy behaves
like a one-factor model, with an “aggregate shock”, the GDP shock b Y . Again, this shock stems
from a multitude of idiosyncratic shocks. The “aggregate shock” causes all ﬁrm-level quantities
to comove. Aggregating, industry-level quantities would comove too. Economically, when ﬁrm
i has a positive shock, it makes the aggregate economy more productive (equations 21 and 24),
and aﬀect the other ﬁrms in three diﬀerent ways. First, other ﬁrms can use more intermediary
inputs produced by ﬁrm i, hence increasing their production. Second, ﬁrm i demands more
inputs from the other ﬁrms (equation 28), which leads their production to increase. Third,
given ﬁrm i commands a large share of output, it will use more of the inputs of the economy,
which tends to reduce the other ﬁrms’ output.24 The net eﬀect depends on the magnitudes of
the elasticities.
24In a more general framework (e.g., Acemoglu 2002), ﬁrm i could use less of some inputs.
15I calibrate the model using conventional parameters to the extent possible.25 The labor
share is α =2 /3. For the share of intermediate inputs Jorgensen, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987),
updated in 1996, provide b =1 /2.26 The elasticity ψ is a conventional ψ =1 .2. 27 To set
ξ ∈ (0,1), I am guided by (26)-(27). In the business cycle, the volatility of hours is greater
than the volatility of the compensation, which means ξ ∈ (1/2,1). Indeed, the ratio of these
volatilities is about 2.5 empirically28, which together with (26)-(27) implies ξ =0 .7. By contrast,
there is little inherited guidance about the share of labor that is ﬂexible in the short run, λ.
Given λ is between 0 and 1, I rely on Laplace’s principle and set λ =1 /2.
Of particular interest is the measure used in section 4, the change in sales per employee,
\ Si/Li. It varies with the true productivity b Ai,w i t hac o e ﬃcient, (1 − λ)β. Hence, idiosyncratic
movements in \ Si/Li are a good measure of the idiosyncratic shocks in productivity. The above
parameter values generate a coeﬃcient of (1 − λ)β =0 .94 in equation (32), which is very close
to one. Hence, labor productivity is a good measure of true productivity.
All the variables in Proposition 4 have a positive loading on the GDP factor b Y ,i . e .t h e y
all comove positively with GDP. I conclude that the above model is a useful benchmark to
understand comovement the business cycle.
4. Tentative Empirical Evidence from the Granular Residual
4.1. The Granular Residual: Motivation and Deﬁnition
This section presents tentative evidence that the idiosyncratic movements of the top 100 ﬁrms
explain an important fraction (one third) of the movement of total factor productivity (TFP).
The key challenge is to identify idiosyncratic shocks. Large ﬁrms could be volatile because of
aggregate shocks, rather than the other way round. I use a variety of ways to attempt to do
this.
25Model (18) allows only for 1 ﬁrm-level shock, e Ai, which generates a perfect correlation between ﬁrm-speciﬁc
movements in sales and employment. However, the data shows the an imperfect correlation between sales and
employement of about 1/2, and a correlation between employment and labor productivity (as measured by sales /
employees) of about -1/2, which indicates two shocks — perhaps one Hicks neutral productivity or demand shock,
and one labor-saving shock. This type of diﬃculty is familiar, and there is no consensus solution. Hence, the
above calibration can only be indicative a deﬁnitive one would require a richer model with two types of ﬁrm-level
shocks. See Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005) for a calibration that takes into account many
relevant frictions
26I thank Susanto Basu for providing this updated number.
27Ah i g h e rψ may be required to better ﬁt the short run behavior. As Golosov and Lucas (2007) note, this
implies that a 10% reduction in price induces a very high quantity response of ψ/(ψ − 1) × 10% = 60%,w h i c h
is probably unrealistically large as a short-run response response. Hence, for the purposes of a calibration of
short-run shocks, one may need a higher ψ. This problem, they point out, is “endemic” in constant elasticity of
substitution models. Other frictions need to be included to solve this problem. I do not attempt to resolve the
problem. For the limited purposes of this calibration, ψ =1 .2 is probably a good benchmark.
28Indeed, in Cooley and Prescott (1995, p.30), the volatility of hours is 1.64% while the volatility of the wage
is 0.65%.
16I start with a parsimonious proxy for the labor productivity of ﬁrm i, the log of its sales per
worker:
zit := ln
Sales of ﬁrm i in year t
Number of employees of ﬁrm i in year t
. (34)
This measure is selected as it requires only basic data that is more likely to be available for
non-US countries, unlike more sophisticated measures such as a ﬁrm-level Solow residual. Most
studies that construct productivity measures from Compustat data use (34). I deﬁne the pro-
ductivity growth rate as git = zit−zit−1.If o c u so nt h eK = 100 ﬁr m st h a th a dt h el a r g e s ts a l e s
in year t − 1. (Results are similar for other choices of K).
Many models, including the model of section 3 (eq. 32) predict that labor productivity
growth rate behaves according to:
git = ft + γ b Ait. (35)
where ft is a factor (proportional to GDP growth in equation 32), and b Ait is the growth rate of
total factor productivity of ﬁrm i. The same models also support the following decomposition:
git = at + aIi(t) + εit (36)
where at is a shock common to all ﬁrms, aIi(t) is a shock speciﬁc to the industry Ii of ﬁrm i,
and εit is a shock that is purely idiosyncratic to ﬁrm i. Hence equations 35 and 36 link ﬁrm
total productivity growth b Ait to market and industry factors, and an idiosyncratic component.
Section 4.3 analyzes more complex models.









My goal is to investigate whether εit, the idiosyncratic component of the total factor productivity
growth rate b Ait of large ﬁrms, can explain aggregate TFP.29 Owing to the relationship between
b Ait and git, this leads to the deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 1 The granular residual Γt is deﬁned as:
Γt :=
PK




29The same analysis, with Γt, can be used to explore the weak form of the granular hypothesis, namely that
idiosyncratic industry level shocks aﬀect a large part of GDP.





Deﬁnition 2 The granular residual with industry de-meaning Γind











where gI(i)t is the equal—weighted average productivity growth rate, amongst the top Q largest
ﬁrms, for the for ﬁrms in i’s industry:
gIit = Mean of gjt,f o rﬁrm j belonging to ﬁrm i’s industry, (41)
and in the top Q ﬁrms by sales at t − 1.
The justiﬁcation for the deﬁnitions is as follows. In the residual Γt, the term gt removes the
common shock at if (36) holds. In the residual Γind
t ,t h et e r mgIit removes the industry shock
at+aIi(t) if (36) holds. Although Γind
t oﬀers a better control than Γt for industry shocks, it does
not have uniformly better properties than Γt. Indeed, if the common component of volatility
is much greater than industry-speciﬁc ﬂuctuations (as often found, for instance in Stock and
Watson 2005, and also predicted by the model in section 3), then Γind
t is a noisier proxy for the
true residual b Λt than Γt, as Lemma 1 in Appendix B indicates. In addition, the Γind
t requires
more data. In any case, Γt and Γind
t are highly correlated, and I use both in the empirical
analysis.
Lemma 1 in Appendix B indicates that the deﬁnition of Γt and Γind
t is optimal, in the
sense of maximizing the correlation with TFP while purging common shocks.30 Also, the online
appendix to this paper shows that identiﬁcation is achieved if the number K of ﬁrms in the
granular residual is very large.31
A simple example illustrates the granular residual.32 Suppose that the economy is made of
one big ﬁrm, which produces half of output, a hundred small ones. The standard deviation of all
growth rates is 10%, and growth rates are given by git = at + εit,w h e r eat is a common shock.
30Finally, an alternative deﬁnition would be to place GDP in the denominator of (38). In practice, such a
measure is well correlated with the granular residual, and yields very similar results.
31As the online appendix to this paper shows, with small K,t h eR
2 is underestimates the true R
∗2 of the
idiosyncratic shocks, by a factor 1 −
1








is about 0.6. Hence, if R
2
empirically found R
2 is 1/3,t h eR
2 of true idiosyncratic shocks is R
∗2 =1 /2. On the other hand, if the number
of ﬁrms K becomes very large, 1 −
1
KHK tends to 1, and the R
2 becomes unbiased. I do not pursue that route,
because for very large K the homogeneity postulate (36) is less likely to hold.
32I thank Olivier Blanchard for this example.
18Suppose that in a given year, GDP increases by 3%, and the big ﬁrm has growth of, say, 6%,
while the average of the small ones is close to 0%. What can we infer on the origins of shocks?
If one thinks of all this being generated by an aggregate shock of 3%, then the distribution of
implied idiosyncratic shocks is 3% for the big ﬁrm, and −3% on average for all small ones. The
probability that the average of the i.i.d. small ones is −3%, given the law of large number for
these ﬁrms, is very small. Hence, it is more likely that the average shock at is around 0%, and
the economy-wide growth of 3% comes from an idiosyncratic shock to the large ﬁrm equal 6%.
The estimate of the aggregate shock is captured by gt, which is close to 0%, and the estimate
of the contribution of idiosyncratic shocks is captured by the granular residual, Γ =3 % .
4.2. Empirical Implementation
I use annual U.S. Compustat data from 1951 to 2008. For the granular residual, I take for each
year t − 1 the K = 100 largest ﬁrms in Compustat that are not in the oil or energy sector.33
Compustat contains some large outliers, which may result from extraordinary events, such as






















Salesi,t−1T (git − gIit)
!
(43)
using the trimming function T (x)=x if |x| ≤ M, T (x)=sign(x) · M if |x| >M .( I u s e
M =2 0 % , but the results are not materially sensitive to this threshold.) In other words, when a
growth rate is larger than 20%, I replace the growth rate by 20%, and I do the same for negative
growth rates.
Table 1 presents regressions of GDP growth and the Solow residual on the granular residual.
These regressions are supportive of the granular hypothesis. The granular residual, and its lagged
values, explain slightly over 1/3 of the ﬂuctuations of GDP growth and the Solow residual.
If only aggregate shocks were important (ft in Eq. 35), then the R2 of the regressions in Table
1 would be zero. Hence the good explanatory power of the granular residual is inconsistent with
ar e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁrm framework. It is also inconsistent with the hypothesis that most ﬁrm-level
volatility might be due to a zero-sum redistribution of market shares.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
33For ﬁrms in the oil and energy sector, the wild swings in world-wide energy prices make (34) too poor a proxy
of total factor productivity.
19Table 1 indicates that the lagged granular residual predicts GDP growth. This may reﬂect
several mechanisms: autocorrelation at the ﬁrm level; imitation dynamics, where a successful
technology is imitated by other ﬁrms; time aggregation; and the propagation of shocks along
supply and demand chains, as in Long and Plosser (1983).
[Insert Table 2 about here]
We next turn to the granular residual with industry-speciﬁc de-meaning, Γind
t ,u s i n g2d i g i t
SIC codes to deﬁne the industries. Table 2 presents the results, which are consistent with those
in Table 1. The R2’s are slightly higher, with an average of 41% (and 38% for the adjusted R2)
across speciﬁcations. The similarity of the results is not surprising, as the correlation between
Γt and Γind
t is 0.84.
In conclusion, idiosyncratic movements of the top 100 ﬁrms seem to explain a large fraction
of the Solow residual and GDP ﬂuctuations.
4.3. Robustness Checks
The main objection to the granular residual is that the control for the common factors may
be imperfect. This section shows that the explanatory power of the granular residual is not
diminished by controlling for previously studied common shocks. Following the work of Hamilton
(2003) and Romer and Romer (2004), I control for oil and monetary policy shocks. To arrive at
an annual frequency, I sum the shocks over the years.
Table 3 characterizes the explanatory power of those variables. Monetary and oil shocks
explain 21% of GDP growth.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Table 4 shows the explanatory power of the granular residual, controlling for oil and monetary
shocks. The mean R2 across speciﬁcations is 53%. Hence, if oil and monetary shocks explain
22% of GDP shocks, the granular residual explains a minimum of 31% of GDP ﬂuctuations.
This estimate is close to the one of 1/3 found in section 4.2.
I conclude that adding controls for oil and monetary shocks conﬁrms the initial estimate
of good explanatory power of the granular residual, of approximately 1/3 of GDP ﬂuctuations.
Further analysis shows that the results seem reasonably robust to changes in the number of large
ﬁrms K,t h en u m b e ro fﬁrms for the industry controls Q, and the trimming level.
Another potential objection to the granular residual is that, while Γind
t controls for industry
shocks and common shocks in model (36), it may not control well for them in an alternative
model such as:
git = βiat + β0
iaIi(t) + εit (44)
20Given the short sample, if the βi’s are completely unconstrained, there does not seem to be
any manageable way to estimate (44) and obtain clean enough estimates of the εit to form
a granular residual of their weighted sum, and test the granular hypothesis.34 Thus, some
parametric restriction seems necessary. The most natural is that the sensitivity to shock might







gIit + εit, (45)
where εit is orthogonal to gIt,a n dlnSj,t−1;,j∈Ii is the mean log size of ﬁrms in i’s industry. I
estimate it by running the OLS regression:




gIit + noiseit (46)
which yields b = −0.34 (s.e. 0.04).35 This result mean that large ﬁrms are actually less sensitive
to aggregate shocks than small ﬁrms. Hence, in the deﬁnition of Γt (respectively Γind
t ), gt
(respectively gIit) adds a negative loading on the industry and GDP shocks. Hence the results
from Γt and Γind
t are biased against the granular hypothesis. I conclude that consideration of
models such as (45) reinforces the previous results, rather than contradicts them.
The above results are considered provisional. The situation is the analogue, with smaller
stakes, to that of the Solow residual.36 Solow understood at the outset that there are very strong
assumptions in the construction of his residual, in particular fully capacity utilization, no ﬁxed
cost etc. But a “puriﬁed” granular residual took decades to construct (e.g., Basu et al. 2006),
and requires much better data, is harder to replicate in other countries, and relies on special
assumptions as well. Because of that, the Solow residual still endures, at least as a ﬁrst pass.
In the present paper too, it is good to have a ﬁrst step in the granular residual, together with
caveats that may help future research do construct a better residual. The conclusion of this
article contains some other measures of granular residuals that build on the present paper.
4.4. A Brief Narrative of GDP and the Granular Residual
Figure 3 plots a time series of the simple and industry-demeaned granular residual. Figure 4
presents a scatter plot with Γt + Γt−1, a choice motivated by the fact that Γt and Γt−1 have
similar coeﬃcients in the regressions of Table 1.
While a full narrative is outside the scope of this paper, this section proposes an interpretation
34For instance, if one regresses git on GDP, and take the residuals, then tautologically the residuals will be
orthogonal to GDP, which by construction contradicts the granular hypothesis. Also, oil and monetary shocks
are not good instruments, as they can aﬀect an industry directly.




gt+noiseit, gives a similar b = −0.21 (s.e. 0.03).
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Figure 3: Time series of per capita GDP growth, the granular residual Γt,a n dt h eg r a n u l a r
residual industry de-meaning Γind
t , computed over the largest 100 ﬁrms by sales in the previous
year.
of the most extreme points.37 A general caveat is that the direction of the causality is generally
hard to assess deﬁnitively, as the measures gt for aggregate economy-wide and industry-wide
movements are imperfect.
The bottom right quadrant of Figure 4 contains two outliers. 1954 can be attributed to the
end of the Korean War. 1982 is commonly called the Volcker recession.
An interesting “granular year” may be 1955, which experiences a high GDP growth, and
a reasonably high granular residual. The likely microfoundation is a boom in car production.
Two main speciﬁc factors seem to explain the car boom: the introduction of new models of cars
(Gordon 1980), and the fact that car companies engaged in a price war (Bresnahan 1987). In
1955, the granular residual is 1.5%, of which 81% is solely due to General Motors.38 In 1956,
the price war in cars ends, and sales drop back to their normal level (the sales of General Motors
decline by 17%). The granular residual is -3.0%, of which 57% is due to General Motors. Hence,
one may provisionally conclude the 1955-1956 boom-bust episode was in large part a granular
event driven by new models and a price war in the car industry.39
An extreme negative granular residual occurs in 1970. This year features a major strike at
General Motors, which lasts ten weeks (September 15 to November 20). Sales of GM fall by
37Gordon (1980), Temin (1998), and the reports of the Council of Economic Advisors provide useful narratives.
38This number is the fraction due to General Motors in the numerator of equation 38. By this deﬁnition, the
sum of the shares is 1.
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Figure 4: Growth of GDP per Capita against Γt + Γt−1, the granular residual and its lagged
value. The display of Γt + Γt−1 is motivated by Table 1, which yields regression coeﬃcients on
Γt and Γt−1 that are similar in magnitude.
31%. Hence, it is plausible to interpret 1970 as a granular year, whose salient event was the GM
strike.40 Additionally, one can interpret the positive granular shock in 1971 (which appears in 4
as label “72”, for representing the sum of the granular residuals in 1971 and 1972) as a rebound
from the negative granular 1970 shock. Hence the General Motors strike may explain the very
negative “70” (1969+1970) point and the very positive “72” (1971+1972) point.
Another interesting granular event happens in 1971. The Council of Economic Advisors
(1972, p.33) reports that “prospects of a possible steel strike after July 31st [1971], the expiration
day of the labor contracts, caused steel consumers to build up stock in the ﬁrst seven months
of 71, after which these inventories were liquidated.” Here, a granular shock — the possibility
of a steel strike — creates a large swing in inventories. Without exploring inventories here, one
notes that such a plausibly orthogonal inventory shock could be used in future macroeconomic
studies.41
Figure 4 reveals that in the 1990s, granular shocks are smaller. Likewise, GDP volatility is
40Temin (1988) notes that the winding down of the Vietnam War (which ended in 1975) may also be responsible
for the slump of 1970. This is in part the case, as during 1968 to 1972 the ratio of defense outlays to GDP was 9.5,
8.7, 8.1, 7.3, 6.7%. On the other hand, the ratio of total government outlays to GDP were respectively 20.6, 19.4,
19.3, 19.5, 19.6% (source: Council of Economic Advisors, 2005, Table B-79). Hence the aggregate government
spending shock was very small in 1970.
41Although 1974 is not a granular year, the low value of the granular residual reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a tt h et o pt h r e e
car companies, and particularly General Motors, were disproportionately aﬀected by the shock. It is likely that,
if large companies were producing more fuel eﬃcient models, the granular residual would have been closer to 0,
and the slump of 1974 could have been much more moderate.
23smaller, a phenomenon explored in the literature42, though of course that needs to be reassessed
with the ﬁnancial crisis that started in 2007.43 Under a granular view, this might be because
ﬁrm-level shocks were minor, particularly for large ﬁrms. Indeed, it seems that the average
ﬁrm volatility has decreased since 1976 in the USA (Davis et al. 2006), even though ﬁrms in
Compustat experienced a rise in volatility (Comin and Philippon 2005), perhaps because of a
selection eﬀect (it is the most volatile ﬁrms, with the largest growth options, that choose to raise
money on the stock market).44 Further research is needed to assess this hypothesis.
5. Empirical Evidence on Concentration and Firm-Level
Volatility
This section illustrates that idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations are indeed of the correct order of magni-
tude to explain aggregate shocks.
5.1. Large Firms are very Volatile
Most estimates of plant-level volatility ﬁnd very large volatilities of sales and employment, with
an order of magnitude σ = 30% to σ = 50% per year (Caballero and Engel 2004, Caballero,
Engel and Haltiwanger 1997, Davis, Haltiwanger, Schuh 1996). Also, the volatility of ﬁrm size
in Compustat is a very large 40% per year (Comin and Mulani 2006). Much of the work has
been focused on the median ﬁrm, but the present paper requires an estimate of the volatility
of large ﬁrms. This sub-section therefore studies the volatility of the top 100 non-oil industry
ﬁrms each year.
Measuring ﬁrm volatility is diﬃcult, because various frictions and identifying assumptions
provide conﬂicting predictions about links between changes in total factor productivity and
changes in observable quantities such as sales and employment (Proposition 4). I consider
the volatility of three measures of growth rates: ∆ln(Salesit/Employeesit), ∆lnSalesit and
∆lnEmployeesit. For each measure and each year, I calculate the cross-sectional variance
amongst the top 100 ﬁrms of the previous year, and take the average.45 I ﬁnd a standard
42See, for example, Blanchard and Johnson (2001), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), and Stock and Watson
(2003).
43It would be interesting to exploit the hypothesis that the ﬁnancial crisis was largely caused by the (ex-post)
mistakes of a few large ﬁrms, e.g. Lehman and AIG. Their large leverage and interconnectedness ampliﬁed into
into a full-ﬂe d g e dc r i s i s ,w h a tc o u l dh a v eb e e nar u n-of-the-mill drop in asset values aﬀecting on average the
ﬁnancial sector. Of course, those ideas are very tentative at this stage.
44As per Eq. 3, the weighing for the relevant “average” ﬁrm level volatility is the square of the sales, not
the sales. This weighing gives an enormously higher weight to the top ﬁrms. A future paper will develop this
point, which requires some statistical care, as standard analysis based on standard errors cannot be applied. Most
moments here are inﬁnite.







24deviation of 12%, 12% and 14% for, respectively, for growth rates of the sales per employee,
of sales, and of employees. Also, amongst the top 100 ﬁrms, the sample correlations are 0.023,
0.073 and 0.033 respectively, for each of the three measure.46 Hence the correlation between
g r o w t hr a t e si ss m a l l .A tt h eﬁrm level, most variation is idiosyncratic.47
In conclusion, the top 100 ﬁrms have a volatility of 12% based on sales per employee. In
what follows I use σ = 12% p e ry e a rf o rﬁrm-level volatility as baseline estimate.
5.2. Herﬁndahls and Induced Volatility
This sub-section discusses the theoretically appropriate measure of the ﬁrm size, for use in
constructing the Herﬁndahl index. The key is given by Hulten’s (1978) result, which shows that
total sales, rather than value added, is the appropriate measure. Consider an economy with
several competitive ﬁrms or sectors, and let ﬁrm i have a Hicks-neutral productivity growth dπi.






Sales of ﬁrm i
GDP
dπi. (47)
The weights add up to more than 1. This reﬂects the fact that productivity growth in a ﬁrm
generates an increase in the economic value of all the inputs it uses. The ﬁrms’ sales are the
proper statistics for that social value. For completeness, Appendix B rederives and generalizes
Hulten’s theorem.
I now draw the implications for GDP volatility. Suppose productivity shocks dπi are uncor-












and so the volatility of the growth of TFP is:




























,w i t hK = 100.
The correlations are positive. Note that a view that would attribute the major ﬁrm-level movements to shocks to
the relative demand for a ﬁrm’s product compared to its competitors, would counterfactually predict a negative
correlation.
47Hence another indirect measure is the volatility of idiosyncratic stock market returns. If a ﬁrm produces ait
per year, of which a fraction f is paid in dividends, and the dividend grows at a rate μ, then the Gordon formula
predicts a stock price pt = atf/(R − μ),w h e r eR is the discount rate. In particular, the volatility of returns
is equal to the volatility of productive capacity a. For the top 100 largest ﬁrms, I ﬁnd an average annualized
volatility of idiosyncratic returns of σ =2 7 % .










Hulten’s theorem allows us to simplify the analysis. For the total volatility, one does not
need to know the details of the input-output matrix. The sales Herﬁndahl is a suﬃcient statistic.
The international Herﬁndahls are from Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009). They analyze the
Dun and Bradstreet dataset, which has a good coverage of the major ﬁr m si nm a n yc o u n t r i e s . 48
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Almost all models predict that GDP growth b Y is proportional to TFP growth b Λ, when there
are no other disturbances. For instance, in equation (25), b Y = μb Λ with μ =1 /(1 − αξ).I f
b Λ is a geometrical random walk, in the neoclassical growth model where only capital can be
accumulated, b Y = μb Λ in the long run, with μ =1 /α,w h i c hg i v e sμ =1 .5.49 So both in the
short run and long run, one gets a relation of the type: σY = μσTFP,i . e .
σGDP = μσπhS. (50)
The calibration of section 3 gives μ =1 /(1 − αξ)=1 .9, which is the value I use for short
term volatility. As seen above, a baseline estimate for the ﬁrm-level volatility is σπ = 12%.
Table 5 displays the results. The sales Herﬁndahl hS is quite large: hS = 22% average over
all countries, and hS =6 .1% for the U.S. By Eq. 48 this implies a GDP volatility σGDP =
1.9 × 12% × 6.1% = 1.4% for the U.S., and σGDP =1 .9 × 12% × 22% = 5.0% for a typical
country. This is very much in the order of magnitude of GDP ﬂuctuations. As always, further
ampliﬁcation mechanisms can increase the estimate. I conclude that idiosyncratic volatility
seems quantitatively large enough to matter at the macroeconomic level.
6. Conclusion
This paper shows that the forces of randomness at the micro level create a inexorable amount
of volatility at the macro level. Because of randomg r o w t ha tt h em i c r ol e v el, the distribution of
48There may be problems with multinationals. For instance, the sales of G.M. are probably counted as the
worldwide sales of G.M.
49If Yt = ΛtK
1−α
t L
α, Λt ∼ e
γt, and capital is accumulated, then in balanced growth path, Yt ∼ Kt ∼ Λ
1/α
t .I n
the long run, ∆lnYt = μ∆lnΛt,w i t hμ =1 /α. This holds also with stochastic growth. If lnΛt is a Brownian
motion with drift, limvar(lnYt/Y0)/t = α
−2var(lnΛt/Λ0)/t.
26ﬁrm sizes is very fat tailed (Simon 1955, Gabaix 1999, Luttmer 2007). That fat-tailness makes
the central limit theory break down, and idiosyncratic shocks to large ﬁrms (or, more generally,
to large subunits in the economy), aﬀect aggregate outcomes.
This paper illustrates this eﬀect by taking the example of GDP ﬂuctuation. This paper
argues that idiosyncratic shocks to the top 100 ﬁrms explain a large fraction (one third) of ag-
gregate volatility. While aggregate ﬂuctuations such as changes to monetary, ﬁscal and exchange
rate policy, and aggregate productivity shocks, are clearly important drivers of macroeconomic
activity, they are not the only contributors to GDP ﬂuctuations. Using theory, calibration and
direct empirical evidence, this paper makes the case that idiosyncratic shocks are an important,
and possibly the major, part of the origin of business-cycle ﬂuctuations.
The importance of idiosyncratic shocks in aggregate volatility leads to a number of implica-
tions and directions for future research. First, and most evidently, to understand the origins of
ﬂuctuations better one should not focus exclusively on aggregate shocks, but concrete shocks to
large players, such as Wal-Mart, Intel, and Nokia.
Second, shocks to large ﬁrms (such as a strike, a new innovation or a CEO change), initially
independent of the rest of the economy, oﬀer a rich source of shocks for VARs and impulse
response studies — the real-side equivalent of the “Romer and Romer” shocks for monetary
economics.
Third, this paper gives a new theoretical angle for the propagation of ﬂuctuations. If Wal-
Mart innovates, its competitors may suﬀer in the short term and thus race to catch up. This
creates rich industry-level dynamics (that are already actively studied in the industrial orga-
nization literature) that should be useful for studying macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, since they
allow one to trace the dynamics of productivity shocks.
Fourth, this argument could explain the reason why people, in practice, do not know “the
state of the economy”. This is because “the state of the economy” depends on the behavior
(productivity and investment behavior, among others) of many large and interdependent ﬁrms.
Thus the integration is not easy, and no readily-accessible single number can summarize this
state. This contrasts with aggregate measures, such as GDP, which are easily observable. Con-
versely, agents that focus on aggregate measures may make potentially problematic inferences
(see Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007) for research along those lines). For example, the aggregate
dividend-price ratio is often used as a key business cycle variable. However, changes in aggregate
dividends may stem only from the policies of a small number of ﬁrms, as found by DeAngelo
et al. (2004). This paper therefore could oﬀer a new mechanism for the dynamics of “animal
spirits”.
Finally this mechanism might explain a large part of the volatility of many aggregate quan-
tities other than output, for instance, inventories, inﬂation, short- or long-run movements in
productivity, and the current account. Fluctuations of exports due to “granular” eﬀects are
27explored in Canals et al. (2007) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009). The latter paper in
particular ﬁnds that lowering trade barriers increases the granularity of the economy (as the
most productive ﬁrms as selected), and imply an increase in the volatility of exports. Blank,
Buch and Neugebauer (2009) construct a “banking granular residual” and ﬁnd that negative
shocks to large banks impact negatively small banks. Malevergne, Santa-Clara and Sornette
(2008) ﬁnd that the granular residual of stock returns (the return of large ﬁrm, minus a re-
turn of the average ﬁrm) is an important priced factor in the stock market, and explains the
performance Fama-French factor models.
In sum, this paper suggests that the study of very large ﬁrms can oﬀer a useful angle of
attack on some open issues of macroeconomics.
28Appendix A: Lévy’s Theorem
The basic theorem can be found in most probability textbooks, e.g. Durrett (1996, p.153).
Theorem 5 Suppose that X1,X 2,... are i.i.d. with a distribution that satisﬁes:
(i) limx→∞ P (X1 >x )/P (|X1| >x )=θ ∈ [0,1]
(ii) P (|X1| >x )=x−ζL(x)
with ζ ∈ (0,2) and L(x) slowly varying50.L e tsn =
Pn
i=1 Xi,a n d




As n→∞ , (sn − bn)/an →d Y where Y is a Lévy distribution with exponent ζ.
The most typical use of Lévy’s theorem is the case of a distribution with zero mean and power-
law distributed tails, P (|X1| >x ) ∼ (x/x0)




Y ,w h e r eY follows a Levy distribution. The sum
PN
i=1 Xi does not scale as N1/2,a si td o e si n
the central limit theorem, but it scales as N1/ζ. This is because the size of the largest units Xi
scales as N1/ζ.











For ζ =2 , a Lévy distribution is a Gaussian. For ζ<2, the distribution has power law tail
with exponent ζ.
Appendix B: Longer Derivations
6.1. Hulten’s Theorem with and without Instantaneous Reallocation of
Factors
For clarity, I re-derive and extend Hulten (1978)’s result, which says that a Hicks-neutral pro-




Sales of ﬁrm i
GDP
dπi.
There are N ﬁrms. Firm i produces good i, and uses a quantity Xij of intermediary inputs
from ﬁrm j.I t a l s o u s e s Li units of labor, Ki units of capital. It has productivity πi.I f
production is: Qi = eπiFi (Xi1,...,X iN,L i,K i). The representative agent consumes Ci of good
50L(x) is said to be slowly varying (e.g. Embrechts et al. 1997, p.564) if ∀t>0,limx→∞ L(tx)/L(x)=1 .
Prototypical examples are L(x)=a and L(x)=alnx for a non-zero constant a.
29i, and has a utility function is U (C1,...,C N). Production of ﬁrm i serves as consumption, and
intermediary inputs, so: Qi = Ci +
P
k Xki. The optimum in this economy reads:
max
Ci,Xik,Li,Ki





































Assume marginal cost pricing.51 GDP is this economy is Y = wL + rK =
P
i piCi.T h ev a l u e
added of ﬁrm i is wLi + rKi, and its sales are piQi.
















Sales of ﬁrm i
GDP
dπi,
which is Eq. 47.
The above analysis shows that Hulten’s theorem holds even if, after the shock, the capital,
labor, and material inputs are not reallocated. This is a simple consequence of the envelope
theorem. Hence Hulten’s result also holds if there are frictions to adjust labor, capital, or
intermediate inputs.
6.2. Proof of Proposition 1














,a n dN−1 PN
i=1 Si →a.s. E [S].
This yields: N1/2h →a.s. E
£
S2¤1/2 /E [S].
51Basu and Fernald (2001) provide an analysis with imperfect competition.
30P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2









I treat the cases where ζ>1 and ζ =1separately. When ζ>2, the variance of ﬁrm sizes is
ﬁnite, and we use Proposition 1.




Si →d E [S].
In addition, S2
































When ζ =1 . Additional care is required, because E [S]=∞. Lévy’s Theorem 5 in Appendix





Si − N lnN
!
→d g,
where g is a Lévy with exponent 1. I conclude lnN · h →d u1/2/g.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3




















To tackle the numerator, I observe that S1−α
i has power law tails with exponent ζ0 =
ζ/(1 − α). I consider two cases.
If ζ0 < 2, xi = S1−α






i uit →d g,
where g is a Lévy with exponent ζ0.
If ζ0 ≥ 2, S1−α
i ui has ﬁnite variance, and N−1/2∆Yt →d g,w h e r eg is a Gaussian.
In both cases:
N−max(1/2,1/ζ0)∆Yt →d g























When ζ =1 ,alnN correction appears, as in the proof of Proposition 2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4










The price of ﬁrm i is: pi = ∂H















Si. H is the sum of sales in the
32economy.
Firm i solves: maxKi,Li,Xi piQi−Xi−wLi,w h i c hg i v e s :(Ki,L i,X i)=( ( 1− α)b/r,αb/w,1 − b)Si ∝
Si.I u s e ∝ to mean that the variables are proportional, up to a factor that does not depend
on i.S o , S
ψ
i ∝ Qi ∝ AiSi by (18), so Si ∝ A
1/(ψ−1)




i , and using
the adding up constraint
P
(Ki,L i,X i)=( K,L,X),w eﬁnd the constant of proportionality:
(Ki,L i,X i)=( K,L,X)A
1/(ψ−1)









Now, we solve for X,i . e .s o l v emaxX H − X. The solution is: Y = H − X = B(ψ−1)/bLαK1−α,
i.e. the announced relation.
Also, as Y = H −
P
Xi,a n dXi =( 1− b)Si, Y = H −
P
(1 − b)Si = bH.
Step 2. Changes, assuming λ =1 . To keep the proof streamlined, I ﬁrst consider the case
λ =1 , i.e. the case no frictions in the adjustment of labor.
We now look at the changes. TFP growth comes from (21), and is also Hulten’s formula.
Y = bH gives b Y = b H. As the total production is: Y = ΛDLα, for a constant D,t h eo p t i m a l
labor supply L maximizes ΛDLα − L1/ξ,s oL = Λ
1
1/ξ−α times a constant, and b L =
ξ
1−αξ b Λ.






b Λ = 1
1−αξ b Λ, the announced relation. The wage
is w = 1





b L, which gives the announced value. It is convenient that
one can solve for changes in the macroeconomic variables without revisiting the ﬁrms’ decision
problems.
We now turn to the ﬁrm-level changes. Optimization of the demand for labor gives wLi =
(1 − b)αSi,s ob Li = b Si − b w. We have, from (18), b Qi = b Ai +( 1− b)αb Li + bb Si. Eq. (54) gives
b Qi = ψb Si +( 1− ψ) b H , and using b Y = b H,
b Qi = ψb Si +( 1− ψ) b Y = b Ai +( 1− b)α
³
b Si − (1 − ξ) b Y
´
+ bb Si,
which gives the announced expressions for b Si and b Qi.52 b Li comes from b Li = b Si − b w. Si was
deﬁned as Si = piQi,w h i c hg i v e sb pi = b Si− b Qi.
Step 3. With a general λ ∈ [0,1].







, so the elasticity associated with LV is ξ0 = ξ/λ, while the production share of
LV is α0 = αλ. Hence, the expression (25) for GDP holds, replacing (α,ξ) by (α0,ξ0)=( αλ,ξ/λ).
As α0ξ0 = αξ, (25) is invariant in λ.








.T h e r e a r e n o w
52In (33), bαλ +1− b is the share of ﬂexible factors, i.e. of the factors that adjust in the short run.
33two wages, wV and wF, which are the marginal products of respectively LV and LF.O n e
ﬁnds: LV ∼ Λ1/(λ/ξ−αλ),i . e . λb LV = ξb Λ/(1 − αξ). As total employment varies as: b L =
λb LV +( 1− λ) b LF = λb LV = ξb Λ/(1 − αξ), we get (26). Likewise, b wV = b Y − b LV , b wF = b Y ,a n d
the weighted wage changes as: b w = λb wV +( 1− λ) b wF = b Y − ξb Λ/(1 − αξ)=( 1− ξ) b Λ.H e n c e
expressions (24)-(27) do not change with a general λ.
For the ﬁrm-level variables, one replaces (α,ξ) by (α0,ξ0)=( αλ,ξ/λ), which delivers the
expressions (28)-(30) and (33). The expression for employment becomes:
b LV,i = β b Ai +( ξ − βb(1 − αξ)) b Y
as so total employment in ﬁrm i varies as b Li = λb LV,i, which gives expression (31). The expression
for (32) follows immediately from \ Si/Li = b Si − b Li.
Lemma 1
The following Lemma is used in section 4.




Y b Ait, and the productivity shocks




wigit,w i t hw e i g h t s(wi)i=1...K satisfying
K X
i=1
wi =0 , so that Γ0
t is not aﬀected by ft. One seeks
residuals Γ0












wi =0 . The highest correlation is achieved by any multiple of the granular residual
Γt given in (38).





is independent of k,o n eﬁrst looks
at the residuals Γ0










































= Y −1γσ2 X
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Forming 0=∂L/∂wi = Y −1γσ2Si−2λγ2σ2wi−μ, so the optimal weights are of the form: wi =
aSi +b,w i t ha and b independent of i. Condition
P
wi =0gives: wi = a
³




and a residual Γ0
t = a
P
Si (git − gt), which proves the Proposition.
34Appendix C: Data Appendix
Firm level data. The ﬁrm-level data comes from Compustat, North America, Industrial Annual.
The frequency is annual, the years 1950 to 2008. I download the following variables: company
name (CONAME), industry name (INAME), industry classiﬁcation code (DNUM), DATA 3 —
Investments — Total ($MM), DATA 6 — Assets — Total ($MM), DATA 12 — Sales (Net) ($MM),
DATA 29 — Employees (M), DATA 78: Inventories - Finished goods ($MM).
I ﬁlter out oil and oil-related companies (DNUM=2911, 5172, 1311, 4922, 4923, 4924 and
1389), and energy companies (DNUM between 4900 and 4940), as ﬂuctuations of their sales come
mostly from worldwide commodity prices, rather than real productivity shocks, and ﬁnancial
ﬁrms (DNUM between 6,000 and 7,000), because their sales do not mesh well with the meaning
used in the present paper.53 To exclude foreign ﬁrms based in the US, I ﬁlter out companies
whose name ends with -ADR, -ADS, -PRE FASB.
A ni m p o r t a n tc a v e a ti si no r d e rf o rU . S .ﬁrms. With Compustat, the sales of Ford, say,
represent the worldwide sales of Ford, not directly the output produced by Ford in the U.S. There
is no simple solution to this problem, especially if one wants a long time series. An important
task of future research is to provide a version of Compustat that corrects for multinationals.
Macroeconomic data. GDP per capita comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
Solow residual is the multifactor productivity of the private business sector from the Bureau of
Labor Studies. The data for the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shocks come from
David Romer’s web page. Their original series (RESID) is monthly, from 1966 to 1996. Here
the yearly Romer-Romer shock is the sum of the 12 monthly shocks in that year. For the years
not covered by Romer and Romer, the value of the shock is assigned to be 0, the mean of the
original data. This assignment does not bias the regression coeﬃcient under simple conditions,
for instance if the data is i.i.d. It does lower the R2 by the fraction of years in which the
assignment is done, which is 0.4.
The data for the Hamilton (2003) oil shocks come from James Hamilton’s web page. A
quarterly Hamilton shock is the amount by which oil price exceeds the maximum price over the
previous year, zero otherwise. This paper’s yearly shock is the sum of the quarterly Hamilton
shocks.
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42GDP growtht GDP growtht Solow Residualt Solow Residualt
Granular Residual Γt 0.574 0.747 0.756 0.871
(0.193) (0.186) (0.155) (0.163)
Granular Residual Γt−1 0.675 0.843 0.410 0.506
(0.187) (0.183) (0.147) (0.156)
Granular Residual Γt−2 0.628 0.320
(0.180) (0.154)
R2 0.26 0.41 0.37 0.42
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.37 0.34 0.39
Observations 57 56 50 49
Table 1: Explanatory Power of the Granular Residual. For the year t = 1952 to 2008, per capita
GDP growth and the Solow residual are regressed on the granular residual Γt of the top 100
non-oil industry ﬁrms (equation 42). The ﬁrms are the largest by sales of the previous year.
Standard errors in parentheses.
GDP growtht GDP growtht Solow Residualt Solow Residualt
Granular Residual Γind
t 1.003 1.279 0.931 1.074
(0.228) (0.215) (0.185) (0.199)
Granular Residual Γind
t−1 0.804 1.183 0.407 0.499




R2 0.34 0.53 0.36 0.41
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.50 0.33 0.37
Observations 57 56 50 49
Table 2: Explanatory Power of the Granular Residual, with industry de-meaning. For the year
t = 1952 to 2008, per capita GDP growth and the Solow residual are regressed on the granular
residual Γind
t of the top 100 non-oil industry ﬁrms (equation 42), removing the industry mean
within this top 100. The ﬁrms are the largest by sales of the previous year. Standard errors in
parentheses.





Monetary Shockt .003464 -.00268
(.05784) (.05602)
Monetary Shockt−1 -.099848 -.077234
(.04805) (.04757)
R2 0.18 0.06 0.22
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.02 0.15
Observations 49 53 49
Table 3: Explanatory Power of oil and monetary shocks. The shocks are the yearly aggregations
of the measures of Hamilton (2003) and Romer-Romer (2004). Standard errors in parentheses.
With Simple Granular Residual With Industry Granular Residual
Granular Residualt 0.565 0.778 0.902 1.188
(0.224) (0.218) (0.261) (0.258)
Granular Residualt−1 0.677 0.936 0.699 1.118
(0.214) (0.212) (0.218) (0.234)
Granular Residualt−2 0.654 0.728
(0.206) (0.203)
R2 0.40 0.53 0.43 0.58
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.45 0.35 0.50
Observations 49 48 49 48
Table 4: Explanatory Power of the Granular Residual, with controls for oil and monetary shocks.
For the year t = 1952 to 2001, per capita GDP growth is regressed on the granular residual Γt of
the top 100 non-oil industry ﬁrms (equation 42-43), and the contemporaneous and lagged values
of the Romer-Romer and Hamilton shocks. The ﬁrms are the largest by sales of the previous
year. Standard errors in parentheses.
All Countries USA
Sales Herﬁndahl hS 22.0 6.1
GDP volatility induced by
idiosyncratic ﬁrm-level shocks
σGDP = μσπhS 5.0 1.4
Table 5: Sales herﬁndahl hS (eq. 49) in 2002, and induced GDP volatility. Units are in %. For
the induced GDP volatility, I take σGDP = μσhS,w i t haﬁrm-level volatility σ = 12% (eq. 50),
a n da na m p l i ﬁcation factor μ =1 .9, as discussed in the text. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson and
Mitton (2009) for the international data, and Compustat for the U.S. data.
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